Abstract

Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines, 57:1, 27-49, DOI: 10.1080/00083968.2022.2077785

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that state leaders try to direct resources toward members of their own party and away from their opponents. However, such “strategies of subversion” are more complicated in reality: incumbents do not necessarily favor their co-partisans and sometimes even sabotage them politically. The present article tries to make sense of this apparent paradox, arguing that seemingly irrational political strategies are in fact rational. It focuses on Niger, a country where subversion of the municipal authorities is extremely common. Qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that subversion strategies do not always help the ruling party in urban areas, in terms of either vote margin or public opinion, but they nevertheless insulate rulers from would-be rivals while securing some electoral gains in the countryside.